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BEBE JORGENSEN, Appellant, v. EARLE 14. JORGEN-
SEN, Respondent. 
[1] Judgment&-Eqwtable :&el1et-Fraud.-Equitable relief from a 
judgment will be denied where it ill sought to re1itigate an ilsue 
involved in the former proceeding on the ground that allega· 
tions or proof of either party was fraudulent or based on mis· 
take, but luch relief may be granted if the party seeking it wal 
precluded by fraud or the miltake trom participating in the pro-
eeeding or trom fully presenting hia case. . 
[2] ld. - Equitable Beliet - Fraud. - In determining whether a 
party is entitled to equitable relief trom a judgment on the 
ground of fraud, it iI necessary to examine the facts in the light 
of the policy that a party who failed to assemble all his evidence 
at the trial eould not be privileged to relitigate a caee, ae well 
as the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a tair ad· 
Tersary proceeding in whieh fully to present hia C&Be. 
[S] IA.-Equitable BeUet-Fraud-Acta Oonstituting.-The policy 
permitting equitable relief from a judgment applie8 when a 
party'l adversary, in violation of a duty arising from a trust 
or confidential relation, hae concealed from him facts 88sential 
to the protection ot hia rights, even though luch tacta con· 
cerned iaauel involved in the caee in which the judgment wu 
entered. 
[4] Divorce-Judgments-BeUef from Fraudulent DecreeL-Th, 
policy permitting a party to seek equitable relief from a judg· 
ment entered in a proceeding in which he wa.~ deprived of a 
fair opportunity fully to present his case, applies to judgments 
in divorce caees approviDg and adopting property .ettlement 
agreements. 
[5] Ill. - Judgments - BeUef from Fraudulent Decrees. - The breach 
of fiduciary duty of a hueband in concealing community prop-
erty aHets in connection with a property settlement agreement 
deprives the wife of an opportunity to protect her rights in the 
concealed aeseta and warrantl equitable relief from a judgment 
approving the agreement. 
Lil See 15 Oal.Jur. 14; 81 Am.Jur. 228. 
KcX. Dig. Beferences: [I, 2] Judgmenta, IllIi1; [a] 11Ic1p .. te, 
1251(4); [H] Divorce, 1117(1). 
) 
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[6] Id,-··Judgments-Relief from Fraudulent Decrecs.- A wi!',',· 
action to set aside portion" of an interlocutury rliYorce dccl'<'p 
approving a property settlement on the ground of fraud is 
barred by the admission in her complaint that she lind her at· 
torney did not investignt'.' the facts, bnt chose instead to rely 
on the statenJents of the husband that certain assels were his 
separate property. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to set aside provisions of an interlocutory divorce 
judgment relating to a property settlement agreement. Judg-
ment for defendant on the pleadings, affirmed. 
Mitchdl, Silberberg & Knupp, Guy Knupp and Peery 
Price for Appellant. 
O'Melveny & Myers, Louis W. Myers and Pierce Works 
for Respondc~lt.. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The parties were married in 1924. Tht.y 
separated in 1944 and executed a property settlement agree-
ment providing that following tl1f~ir divorce the husband 
would pay the wife $30,000 annually for her support and 
that of their .-:hildren. The wife thereafkr brought an acti{)ll for 
divorce in which the husband made no appearance. Hhe 'IL· 
ta:'n,:<1 Il:l interlocutory decree in which thl' propert:. selth!-
ment agre('ment was approved and adopted, and a final decree 
wa:; subse(lnentl~' entered. !. n the present action plaintiff seeIn; 
to sd asirle the provisions of the interlocutory decree relating" 
to the property settlement agreemcnt, on the grounds of fraud 
or mistakt'. She allegcd in her amended complaint that some 
,'f the asr;(:is listed in the agreement as separate property of 
the· hllshafill were cOl1lmunity property and that defendant 
pr.:>cnrcd her consent to the a~reelllent by fraudulentl;:r- rep-
resenting those assets as hi,; separate property. Plaintiff 
fnrther alleged that she and the attorney who represented J:~r 
wh( n the propf'rt~· settlellleut agreement was n~ade, relying 
exelusivdy upon defeudant's representations, (!id not investi-
gate whether the assets in question were cOlllClUnity or 
separate prfJperty_ Plaintiff alleged as all alternative cause 
of act:on that defendant made his representatiolls by mistake 
upou the advice of his COU!H;(,l. 
) 
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'l'he agrcC'n1C'nt recites that it "is based upon a full dis-
closure of aU real and prr.~fJllal pl'(lJlC'rtics and shall constitute 
n final settlC'ment, adjust1l1ent <llld d i Yi~i(lll of t lIP JlroJ)(>rt~· and 
the financial mat.t.ers of the part.il's." PJllintifl' aJl,':!\'S that 
she consented to this statemcnt and was satisficl1 with the 
contract because she was persllaclrrl b~' the rl'presC'ntations of 
defendant that under the Ilgrct'1\H'nl she received half the 
commudty property; that defendant had exclush'e control 
and mauagement of the property of the parties throughout 
their married life and was therefore aware that the pr,.perty 
listed in the agreement as his separat.e property was com-
munity property; that she was not .. familiar with the facts, 
since she was preoccupied with her duties as housewife and 
mother; that in making the agreE'ment an~ snbmitting it to 
the conrt she relied on defendant's honesty and the truthful-
ness of his representations: ar.d that the attorney who repre-
sented her in the negotiations with respeet to the property 
settlement agreement anll had previously represented her in 
the negotiations with respect toa voting trust a~reement with 
defendant was recommended to her by defendant, who paid 
the fee for his services. 
In his answer defendant demed that the propcrty sdtlement 
agreement classified as his separate property any assets in 
which the wife had a community interest or that he made 
false repre.o:;entations regarding an~' assets mentioned in the 
agreement. He also filed a cross-complaint praying that his 
title to the assets in question be qnieted. At thc trial defend-
nut r.bjected to the introdnction of any "vidence by plaintiff, 
on the ground that her amended complnint was insnfilcient to 
state a cause of action. The court sl1stained this oujection, 
and after dcfend:mt had introduced into evidence thl.' property 
settlement agreement and thc intcrlocutory and final decree 
of divorce, entered a judglllCnt for dcfendnnt on the complaint 
and cross-complaint. 
Since the court entered judgment on t.he pleadings with 
respect to plaintiff's amended complaint, it must be assumed 
for the purposes of this appeal thnt the allegations therein 
are true. With regard to the parthion of ihe community 
property plaintiff alleged that before the property 8E'ttlement 
agreement was executed, the parties n~reed thilt each was to 
receiw ha.lf the community property And that defendant 
represented to her that the agreement, drafted· by his at-
) 
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torneys, gave her half the community property, whereas 
actually it depriv~d her of her community property interest 
in certain shares of stock, namely, half the outstanding stock 
of the Earle M. Jorgenscll Company (hereaftcr referred to 
as Jorgensen Company) and all the ontstanding stock of the 
Earle M. Jorgensen-Forge Division (hereafter referred to as 
Forge Division). 
It appears frOID the amended complaint that the outstand-
ing stock of the .Jorgensen Company consists of 1,000 shares, 
500 of which were reprcsclJted h.\' certificate No. 14 and 500 
by certificate No. lri at the time the property settlement 
agreement WUi:; cxc(:uted. Defendant owned the 500 share!> 
represented by certificate No. 14 before his marriage to plain-
tiff. He acquired the GOO shares represented by certificate 
No. 15 from his formcr partner in 1927. approximately three 
years after the mnrriflge. TJwreafter defendant remained the 
sole manager of the corporati.on. According to the terms of 
the property settlemcnt agreement the parties in 1943 "en-
tered into a voting trust agreer:J.ent pursuant to which said 
one thousand (1,000) shar0s were to be held and are now 
held by the Hnsband as voting trustee. Prior thereto, said 
five hundred (500) shares evidenced by Certificate No. 14 
were the sole and separate property of the husband, and said 
five hundred (500) shares evidenced by Certificate No. 15 
were community property of the parties. Said voting trust 
agreement provides that the beneficial interests under such 
trust shall be held by the parties in the same manner as said 
shares were owned by them immediately prior to the creation 
of said trust . . . . The parties h~reby confirm the said bene-
ficial interest is held and owned hy them in suid manner, and 
that upon termination of snid voting trnst said five hundred 
(500) shares evidenced by Certificate No. 14 will be owned 
by the Hushand as his separate property, and said five hun-
dred (500) shares evidenced by Certificate No. 15 will be 
held and owned by the parties as community property." 
The property settlement agreement also provided that" In 
the event that either party shall at any time hereafter obtain 
8 final decree of divorce from the other, but not otherwise, 
the following provisions of this paragraph shall become and 
shall thereafter remain effective .... The 500 shares of 
Earle ~I. Jorgensen Company evi(lenced by Certificate No. 
]4. alld Olw-half of the !iOO shares of said corporation evi-
denced by Certificate No. 15 shall be the sole and separate 
) 
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property of the Husband, and the othcr one-half of said 500 
shares evidcnced by Certificate No. 15 shall be the sole and 
separate property of the Wife .... " Plaintiff alleges, how-
ever, that the 500 sharf's represented by certificate No. 14 and 
designated in the agreement as separate property had a value 
not exceeding $55,000 when the parties married and had only 
slightly increased in value when in 1927 defendant acquired 
the other 500 shares and became the sole manager of the cor-
poration; that these shares were worth more than $1,000,000 
when the parties executcd the property settlement agrcement; 
and that this incrcase in value was primarily a result of de-
fendant's skill and industry in managing the corporation. 
She contends therefore that these 500 shares were largely 
community property at the time of the property settlement 
agreement. 
As to the shares of the Forge Division, plaintiff alleges 
that this corporation was organized in 1942 with an authorized 
capital stock of 1,000 shares, each with a par value of $100, 
of which only three shares were issued, and that these shares 
were acquired by defendant with community property funds; 
that they werp worth $300 when the corporation was or-
ganized but that by the timt' the property settlement agree-
ment was expcnted their yalue had been augmented to $175,000 
by thp skill and industry of defendant as manager of the 
corporation. Plaintiff contends that these shares were there-
fore entirely community property when the property settle-
ment agreement was executed and that it was through the 
fraud of defendant that the property settlement agreement 
provides that" All shares of Earle M. Jorgensen Co.-Forgc 
Division, a California corporation, standing in the name of 
the husband ... are his sole and separate property." 
Plaintiff contends that the part of the interlocutor;>" decree 
approving and adopting the property settlement agreement 
was induced by defendant's false representations and that 
they constitute extrinsic fraud or mistake entitling her to 
equitable relief from the decree. Defendant on the other 
hand contends that if he perpetrated any fraud it was in-
trinsic and there can be no equitable relief from the decree. 
Plaintiff relies on Taylor Y. Taylor, 192 Cal. 71, 79 [218 P. 
756, 51 A.L.R. 1074], and Milekovich v. Quinn, 40 Cal.App . 
.537 [181 P. 256]. Defendant relies on Howard v. Howard, 
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111" hrJd that equitable relit·f from a divorce decrec approving 
lind auopting a property settlelllent agrecmcnt is available 
10 a wife if the hu<;band frn1l(1ulently secured h~r consent to 
Ihe agreelllcnt by concraJillg cOllllJlIInity property :lssets, for 
such concealment precludes her from esfablishing her rights 
thereto. The Howard case, supra, held that a husband was 
not entitled to equitable relicf from the provisions of a divorce 
decree approving and adopting a property settlemcnt agrce-
ment upon the allegation that he entered into the agreemrnt 
in reliance upon representations of his wife that she was a 
faithful wife and mother, whereas during coverture and before 
the execution of the agreement she had repeatedly committed 
adultery. In that case it was determined that by submitting 
1 he property settlement agreement to the court the issue as 
to its fairness had been tendered in the divorce action and 
that therefore the alleged fraud perpetrated by the wife was 
intrinsic to the issues involved in the divorce action and should 
have been guarded against at the trial thereof. Defendant 
contends that by the same reasoning the fraud alleged in the 
cases on which plaintiff relies was intrinsic. 
Taylor v. Taylor, 192 Cal. 71 [218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074] 
and Milclco1)ick v. Quinn, 40 Cal.App. 537 [181 P. 256) as 
well as Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319 [163 P.2d 439), 
recognize that when equitable relief from a final judgment 
is sought, it makes an important difference whether the fraud 
or mistake is intrinsic or extrinsic to the issues involved in 
the case in which the judgment was entered. [1] The public 
policy underlying the principle of res judicata that there must 
be an end to litigation requires that the issues involved in a 
case be set at rest by a final judgmcnt, evcn though a party 
has persuaded the court or the jury by false allegations sup-
ported by perjured testimony. This policy must be considered 
toge ther with the policy that a party shall not he deprived 
of a fair adversary proCleeding in which fully tn present his 
casco Thus. equitable relief will be denied where it is 
sought to relit.igate nn issue involved in the former proceed-
ing on the ground that allegations or proof of either party 
was fraudulent or based on mistake, but such rclief may be 
granted if the party seeking it was precluded by fraud or the 
mistake of the other party from participating in the proceed-
ing or from fully presenting his case. (Gale v. Witt, 31 
CaJ.2d 362. 365 1]88 P.2d 755); Howan! v. Howard. 27 
Ca1.2d 319, 321 [163 P.2d 439]; Westphal v. Westphal, 20 
) 
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Ca1.2d 3n, 397 lI2(; P.2d 10~, I; 1,llrTII/>c/' v. 'I'rary, ~l Cal. 
2<1 64~ [134 P.2d 2(j~ I ; Olil'cra v. Gra.cc, 19 Cal.2d ~70, 575 
[122 P.2d 564, 140 A.L.R. 1328) ; Carr v. Bank of A.merica, 
11 Ca1.2d 366. 371-373 [79 P.2d 1096, llG A.L.R. 1282); 
Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Ca1.2d 322, 325-326 [65 P.2d 777, 113 
A.L.R. 1230); Ringwalt v. Bank of A.merica, 3 Ca1.2d 680, 
684-685 145 P.2d 967J ; Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 476-
479 [23 P.2d 758, 8R A.L.R. 1194) ; Tracy v. Mm'r, 151 Cal. 
363, 371 [90 P. 832, 121 .A.m.St.Rep. 117] ; f>CC, Restatcment, 
Judgments, p. 588; 3 Freeman, Judgments (5th cd.), §§ 1233-
1235; 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th cd.), p. 610.) 
'I'he terms" intrinsic" and "extrinsic" fraud or mistake are 
g('nt,rally accepted as appropriate to describe the two differ-
ent categories of cases to which these policies of the law 
apply (Freeman, 1:bid., p. 2568). They do not constitute, 
however, a simple and infilllible formula to determine whr,ther 
in a given case the facts surrounding th(' frand or mistake 
warrant equitable relief from a judgment. (Larrahce v. 
Tracy, 21 Ca1.2d 645, 649 [134 P .2d 265]; sec, Frpeman, 
ibid., p. 2570.) [2] It is necessary to examine the facts in the 
light of the policy that a party who failed to aSi:emblf> all 
his eyidl'nce at the trial should not be privilcbed to relitigate 
u case, as well as the policy permitting a party to spck relief 
frOID a judgment entered in a proceeding in which he was 
deprived of a fair opportunity fully to present hi~ case. 
(3] 'I'he latter policy applies when a party's adversary, 
in "iolation of a duty arising from a trust or confidl'lltial 
relation, has concealed from him facts essential to t he protec-
tion of his rights, even though such facts concerned it;sues 
involved in the case in which the judgment was I'ntered. 
"The failure to perform the duty to speak or make dis-
"losurcs which rests upon one because of a trust or confidential 
relation is obviously a fraud, for \vhieh equit.y Illa;)" rcli('\'e 
from a judgment thereby obtained, even though the breaeh 
of duty occurs during a judieip..1 procoeding and ill'.'olves 
false testimony, and this is true whether such fraud be re-
garded as extriusic or as an exception to t.he extrinsic fraud 
ruk" (3 Pr~el1lan, Jud~llll'nts (5th cd.), p. 2576; see, Loull 
Y. Kipp, 155 Wis. 347 [145 N.W. 183, 5 A.I.i.R 655].) Iu 
this state equitable relief has becn granted from final judg-
ments settling the accouuts of guardians, administrators. or 
exeeutors who withheld information that would hUVL! enahled 
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the bellcfieiaries to attack tlkC aecounts (LataiUadr v. Orena, 
91 Cul. 5Grl, 576 [27 P. 924, 23 Am.St.Rcp. 219J; Silva v. 
Santos, 13H Cal. 536, 541 [71 P. 703J ; .tlldrich v. Barton, 138 
Cal. 220, 223 [7] P. 169, 94 Am.St.Rep. 43 J ; Simonton \'. 
Los Angeles Trust &' Sav. Bank, 192 Cal. 651, 655, 657 [221 
P. 368] ; :l1organ v. Asher, 49 Cal.App. 172, 182 [193 P. 288] ; 
see Griffith v. Godey, 113 U.S. 89, 93 [5 S.Ct. 393, 28 L.Ed, 
934] ). The same principle applies to decrees distributing 
the e!5tah' of It decedent adversely to the rights of beneficiaries 
who have been precluded from pursuing their rights by con-
ceabent of facts by the fiduciary (Larrabee v. Tracy,21 Cal. 
2d 645, 649 [134 P.2d 265J ; Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Ca1.2d 322, 
325 [65 P.2d 777, 113 A.L.R. 1230]; Campbell-l(awanna-
nakoa v. Campbell, 152 Cal. 201, 210 [92 P. 184) ; Bacon v. 
Bacon, 150 Cal. 477,490 l89 P. 317 J; 8ohlc1' v. Sohler, 135 
Cal. 323 [67 p, 282, 87 Am,St.Rep. 98] ; see, Carr v. Bank of 
America, 11 Ca1.2d 366, 371-374 [79 P.2d 1096, 116 A.L.R. 
1282J ; RiugU:CLlt v. Bank of Arne1'ica, 3 Cal.2d 680, 684 [45 
P .2d 9(j7]) and to other probate decrees obtained under 
similar circumstances. (Caldwell Y. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 475 
[23 P.2J 758, 88 A.L.R. 1194]; Estate of ROliS, 180 Cal. 651, 
658 [182 P. 752] j Ourtis v. Schell, 129 Cal. 208,215 [61 P. 
951, 79 Alll.St,Rep. 107 J ; see 23 Cal.L.Rev. 79, 83.) 
[4] The same principle also applies in the cases concern-
ing equitable relief from judgments approving and adopting 
property settlemellt agreements relied on by plaintiff. In 
MilekOV'ich v. Quinn, 40 Cal.App. 537 [181 P. 256], the wife 
alleged in u divorce action that her husband held securities 
worth sixty-thousand dollars, which were community prop-
erty. The husband denied her allegation, stating in his an-
swer and ill an affidavit filed in reply to an application of the 
wife for alimony pendente lite that the sec1lriti!'s held by 
him were worth not more than two thousand dollars. Relying 
on these representations, the wife entered into a property 
settlemellt agreement specifying the community property assets 
that she was to receive and providing that thL' husband should 
receive the remainder of the community property. The agree-
ment was approved and adopted by the court ill an inter-
locutory divorce decree. The wife sought equitable relief 
from the provisions of the decree relating to the agreement, 
since the husband had concealed from her bonds in the par 
valu!' of forty-five-thousand dollars acquired with community 
property funds, which be had withdrawn from his safe-
) 
May 1948] JOROENSEN 1.1 •• JORGENSEN 
f32 C.3d 13; 193 P.2d 728] 
21 
deposit box and delivered to a custodian after thE' commence-
llIent of the divorce action; 
In Taylor v. 7'aylor, 192 Cal. 71 [218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 
1074], the wife entered into a property settlement agreement 
wherein she released all obligations of the husband as to sup-
port and alimony and disclaimed all her rights to community 
property ill consideration of the payment of $500 to her by 
the husband. She sought equitable relief from a divorce de-
cree approving and adopting this agreement, on the ground 
that the husband had concealed from her the existence of 
certain real property acquired with community property funds 
placing it in the name of his brother. 
[6] As the manager of the community property the hus-
band occupies a position of trust (Civ. Code, §§ 172-173,158), 
which is not terminated as to assets remaining in his hands 
when the spouses separate. It is part of his fiduciary duties 
to account to the wife for the community property when the 
spouses are negotiating a property settlement agreement. 
The concealment of community property assets by the husband 
from the wife iu connection with such an agreement is there-
fore a breach of a fiduciary duty of the husband that deprives 
the wife of an opportunity to protect her rights in the con-
cealed assets aud thus warrallts equitable relief from a judg-
ment approving SUCll agreement. "~hell community property 
is entrusted to the wife, she likewise occupies a position of 
trust. It has therefore been held that a husband may obtain 
equitable relief from a divorce dE'cree incorporating a property 
settlement agreement obtained by the fraud of the wife in 
concealing community assets entrusted to her control. (Boul-
lester v. Superior Cou.rt, 137 Cal.App. 193, 195 [30 P.2d 
59].) It is immaterial whether the husband or the wife has 
submitted the property settlement to the conrt for approyal; 
thE' fraud of one spouse in concealing the assets, if not dis-
covered by the other, precludes the latter from protecting 
his or her rights as to the concealed assets in the divorce pro-
ceeding. 
Howard v. Howard, 27 CaJ.2d 319 [163 P.2d 439], is 
clearly distinguishable from thl'se cases, for ill that ease the 
husband did not allege that the wife pl'oellred the property 
settlement agreement by cOlH'ealillg iufol'lllatioll in violation 
or a fiduciary duty of disclosure. Her alleged fraud related 
to acts of adultery, which she was under no fiduciary duty 
) 
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to disclose, for those acts constitut.ed a gronnd for divorce. 
ThE' law imposes upon a spouse seeking a divorce t.he burden 
of proving facts const.ituting a statut.ory ground for divorce 
and of presenting corroboration of his own testimony or of 
admissions of the other spouse. (Civ. Code, § 130 i Code Civ. 
Proc., § 2079; Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Cal. 746, 748 [154 P. 8371 ; 
Deyoe v. Superior Oourt, 140 Cal. 476,483 [74 P. 28, 98 Am. 
St.Rep. 73] i see also, Civ. Code, § 132; Grannis v. Superior 
Oourt, 146 Cal. 245, 248 [79 P. 891, 106 Am.St.Rep. 23].) 
If failure to reveal grounds for divorce warranted equitable 
relief from divorce judgments, the stability of such judgments 
and titles to property thereunder would be seriously imperiled. 
[6] The issue in the present case is whether under the 
facts stated in her amended complaint, the wife was deprived 
of a fair opportunity to submit her case fully to the court 
because of a breach of a fiduciary duty of the husband. There 
is no allegation in the complaint that defendant concealed 
assets that were part of the community property. The assets 
were disclosed, and the complaint is based on the theory that 
defendant fraudulently claimed certain community property 
as his separate estate. The classification of property as sep-
arate or community is frequently difficult. A husband at 
the time of divorce or separation is entitled to take a position 
favorable to his own interest in claiming as his separate 
property assets that a court might hold to be community 
property. Confronted with the assertion by the husband that 
certain assets are his separate property the wife must take 
her own position and if necessary investigate the facts. 
(Ohampion v. Woods, 79 Cal. 17, 20 [21 P. 534, 12 Am.St. 
Rep. 126]; Dowling v. Spring Valley Water 00., 174 Cal. 
218,222 [162 P. 894] ; Haviland v. Southern Oalifornia Edison 
00., 172 Cal. 601, 609 [158 P. 328] ; see, Brown v. Brown, 
170 Cal. 1,5 [147 P. 1168] ; Lindley v. Hinch, 57 Cal.App.2d 
717,719 [135 P.2d 421].) If the wife and her attorney are 
satisfied with the husband's classificatiorl of the property as 
separate or communit~·. the wife cannot reasonably contend 
that fraud was committed or that there was snch mistake as 
to allow her to overcome the finality of a judgment. In the 
present case plaintiff alleged that she and her attorney relied ex-
clusively on her hnsband's representations that the shares in 
question were his separate property and that her attorney 
made no examination or investigation to ascertain whether 
the shares were cOlllmunity property. She did not allege that 
June 1948) GI{EE]\'TIELn 1'. M .. TInea 
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hcr attorney intclltiollally fail<'d tn pruteet her interests. 
Plaiutiff is barred fr0111 obtaining equitable relief by her ad-
mission that she anu hrr attorJwy did not investigate the 
facts, choosing instead to rely 011 the statements of the hus-
band as to what part of the disclosed property was community 
property. 
'l'he judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 24, 
1948. 
